Consultation Game and Strategic Traits between Superior and Subordinate Government in Administrative Division Adjustment: The case of SS town

行政区划调整的过程中常常发生上下级政府的互动，然而学界对其运作机制的理论探讨和具体案例的经验研究尚显不足。本文以中国近年来行政区划调整的现实为基础，在理论分析中引入空间和位序因素，建构了两个相互联系的理论模型，即政府区划决策—收益模型和上下级间的方案“协商博弈”模型。继而借助模型对SS镇的区划调整案例进行考察，探究政府在区划决策和互动中的行为逻辑。本研究表明，博弈参与者在具体环境中采用的策略特征包括以内博外、零正嵌套、平衡共赢等，博弈策略的选择受环境因素与政府能动性两方面影响。此外，本文的理论探讨推进了政府行为的分析和上下级互动机制的讨论，对政府内各层级在其他领域的互动也有一定借鉴意义。

Based on the administrative division adjustment practices in recent years in China, we firstly construct a theoretical model which includes the factors of space and location order. The analysis emphasizes on the division decision models of the government and consultation model between the superior and subordinate governments. We then present the strategies used during administrative division adjustment in SS town, between F city and N district, by our theoretical model. The strategic traits of the participants of the game under specific circumstances contain obtaining benefit outside by interior adjustment, integrating zero-sum and positivesum games and the “win-win” game. Moreover, this article pushes forward the analysis of governmental behaviors and interactive mode between the superior and subordinate governments.

张践祚；刘世定；李贵才

国家科技支撑计划课题“村镇区域空间规划技术研究”（2012BAJ22B05）资助。

欢迎阅读《社会学研究》！您是该文第3625位读者！