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英文标题: | Government-corporate Relations, Two-Way Rent Seeking and the FDI Miracle in China |
摘要: | 中国究竟如何创造出外资奇迹?根据作者调查,中国吸收的制造业外资中,相当比例是受各地政府的优惠政策所吸引。但地方政府为何如此热衷招商?关键在于政府与外资间的“双向寻租”活动。这种活动既有传统寻租的企业逢迎政府,也有政府逢迎企业的“反向寻租”活动。作者认为,正是这样的反向寻租,一方面遏制了寻租活动的过分猖獗,另一方面诱使地方政府提供大量优惠,换取外资企业的投资落地。中国的外资奇迹就这样被制造出来了。本文聚焦在“招商引资”过程中的政企互动,说明地方政府与外资企业的激励机制、行为及其后果。通过上述分析,作者希望对中国如何参与国际生产提供一个制度层面的解释。 |
英文摘要: | How does China create its FDI miracle? The authors find that a large amount of FDI was attracted by preferential policies offered by local governments.Why are local governments so eager to offer these deals? This has to do with the rent seeking that runs in both ways between local governments and overseas enterprises.It is especially the reversed rent-seeking, during which the local governments seek rents from overseas enterprises, that contributes most to attracting FDI to China.The reversed rent-seeking not only constrains the rampancy of rent seeking, but also pushes the governments to offer preferential policies.This is how the FDI miracle in China is created.This paper also illustrates the incentives, bargaining processes, and the consequences of the government-corporate interaction over FDI.It proposes a micro-level institutional analysis of how China blends into the world economy. |
作者: | 耿曙;陈玮; |
作者单位: | 上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院 |
期刊: | 社会学研究 |
年.期:页码 | 2015.5:141-163 |
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关键词: | 政企关系;外资;地方政府;招商引资;寻租; |
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