Government Credit as Signal: Information mechanism of private depository institution in Wenzhou and Taizhou after reform

本文试图从“政府信用信号发送”机制的角度去理解中国改革后民营存款类金融机构发展的兴衰。存款类金融产品的高考核成本、存款类金融机构的高负债率以及“说坏话”机制的局限性等使声誉机制特别重要。声誉机制依赖于良好的产权保护。中央政府对私人进入和经营银行业严格的管制政策使得民营银行家们更不愿意或更难对自身声誉做投资。他们把地方政府对他们的支持作为信号来吸引存款,建立声誉。本文称之为“政府信用信号发送”机制。这一机制下,民营银行家和储户都对政府的相关政策高度敏感。这使得中国民营存款类金融机构的发展更容易因为管制政策的变化而出现波折。改革后温州和台州地区民营存款类金融机构的发展历史为上述解释提供了初步证据。

Why the private depository institutions didn’t develop as successful as other private enterprises in China? How do the government’s financial regulation policies influence the private depository institution development after reform? This paper tries to address how the information mechanism，which named“governmentcredit signaling mechanism” in this paper may help us to understand the rise and decline of the private depository institution. Because of high debt ratio， high measurement cost of depository financial products and the limitation of “gossip” mechanism，the reputation mechanism，which relies on repeated games and good property rights protection，is very important to depository institution. Facing the strict market access and operation regulations from the central government，the private bankers have less incentive and more difficulties to invest on reputation. The private bankers may use the supports from the local government as signals to attract potential depositors and establish reputation. This government-credit signaling mechanism determines that both the depositors and the private bankers are very sensitive to the changes of policies. The data and cases from Wenzhou and Taizhou support the deductions of the above explanations. 

浙江大学紫金计划;上海市教委E-研究院建设计划项目;国家社科基金一般项目(09BJL013);国家留学基金委的经费支持

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