Informal Power Structure and Economic Policy of Local Government in China

本文分析了浙江省内部各县市经济政策差异的历史特征及其政治归因。本文认为,浙江不同地区的共产主义革命传统塑造了基层政权中不同的非正式权力结构。解放前建立地方革命武装的地区,本地干部在基层政权中的影响力较强,但他们与上级政治精英的非正式联系疏远,不仅缺乏晋升的机会,而且受到了政治打压。为了长期的政治生存,他们有激励推行保护产权和市场的经济政策,进而使地方经济获得了快速发展。本文利用1952-1998年浙江分县数据检验了上述假说。

In this research, we argue that the origin of the spatial variations of local economic policies in Zhejiang province from 1950s to 1990s could be traced back to the revolutionary legacies prior to 1949, which is embodied by the events forged at the critical historical junctures. The hypothesis is that ? the revolutionary history prior to 1949 shaped the informal power structures in Zhejiang, which in turn determined the attitudes of local officials toward the capitalistic development under their administration since 1949 until into the 1990s. To be more specific, if a particular locality established its own revolutionary base, and set up its own military forces before 1949, local officials were politically powerful but meanwhile they were oppressed in the sense that their factional ties with higher authorities were weak and their political upward mobility was blocked. As a result, local political elites in these places had more incentives and capabilities than they would have otherwise to protect and promote the economic development both in the Maoist era and in the reform era. The hypothesis is supported by the county-level data of Zhejiang from 1952 to 1998.

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