Bureaucratic Structure and Policy Implementation

政策执行会出现失效、走样已经成为学界的“共识”,但对此问题的分析机制却并不明晰,大多研究只是提出抽象的概念予以阐释。本文深入考察一项政策的具体执行过程,从相关部门的具体行动路径分析入手,讨论国家政策如何遭遇具有不同行动特点的科层部门,如何牺牲政策原初定位与相关部门的诉求进行妥协,又如何在实际执行过程中发生转型。根据对个案的详细考察,本文提出,在目标、激励与约束都存在巨大差异的情况下,很多国家政策的执行面对的是高度分化的科层结构,这种结构产生了政策与科层组织之间的摩擦,降低了政策的执行力,从而导致政策被废止或执行走样。

It is widely agreed that policy implementation is often distorted and loses efficacy in practice, however, existing studies failed to find the mechanisms of why and how policy implementation is distorted. Through an in-depth investigation of a policy implementing process, this paper attempts to reveal the dynamic process of how the central government's policy is implemented by heterogeneous local bureaucratic branches, which are the actors carrying out nearly all policies in China. By focusing on the specific behaviors of different participants of the bureaucratic system, the authors illustrate the mechanisms of policy compromise and transformation during policy implementation. The paper argues that, due to heterogeneous goals, incentives and the constraints of different bureaucratic branches, the policy implementation process inevitably confronts a highly differentiated bureaucratic structure. In order to alleviate the friction between policy and the bureaucratic system, some policies are abolished, and some are distorted.

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