Local Government and the Development of Local Industries: A case study based on Sidong county

本文以东北某农牧县四东县的调查为例,分析了基层政府打造地方产业发展谋求晋升的运作机制,指出:在中国转型背景下政府干预经济与社会创新活动中存在共通的内在逻辑。在地方,围绕产业发展指标已形成了一套衡量政府官员政绩、上下级政府共同认可的制度安排与激励结构。这一制度结构约束并激励基层政府通过引领性干预——甄别、选择、投入、扶持、包装等方式达到打造地方产业的目的。为了在政府竞争中获得更高的比较效用,基层政府官员会选择与其他乡镇有所区别的产业打造策略,新任政府官员也会选择与本乡镇原有产业不同的产业策略,即打造某项(些)典型产业。上述状况导致的结果则是,基层政府联手塑造了地方辖域内以产业区别度高、更新率快、典型性强为特点的产业格局。 

Taking a farming county in Northeast China as an example, this paper tries to reveal and analyze the operation mechanism of grass-roots governments in creating local industries. The author finds that in the local political market, a set of institutional arrangement and incentive structure has been established to measure government officials’ performance on the development of industries, and all levels of local governments recognize this arrangement and structure. This institutional structure both motivates and restrains the grass-roots governments in achieving the goal of creating local industries through guidance and intervention. In order to get better utility in government competition, grass-roots government officials would choose different industries from other towns to create, and new government officials would choose different industries from their predecessors, that is to say, creating some typical industries of their own to get competitive advantage. Finally, the author argues that every town adopts the typical industry strategy, which has shaped the local industrial structure, characterized by high industrial variation, fast update rates and strong local feature.

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