本文从社会学视角分析我国人民陪审员选任制度改革的实践逻辑。《人民陪审员法》的颁布旨在依靠随机选任模式让更多普通公民有机会成为陪审员。通过追踪M市人民陪审员选任实践过程发现，随机模式并未如社会期待的那样实现陪审员结构的“去精英化”，反而导向了“再精英化”的僵局。背后的逻辑是地方推行选任工作的“压力分摊”机制，这一应对机制消解和俘获着随机选任理应导向的大众化结局。“压力分摊”描述了压力型体制下地方司法行政部门在纵横交错的行政链条中自我突围和释放压力的一种实态状况，也是我们理解地方治理逻辑的一条重要线索。

This article analyzes the practical logic of China’s people’s assessor selection system from a sociological perspective. “People’s Assessor Law of the People’s Republic of China” was promulgated with the aim of providing more ordinary citizens with the opportunity to serve as assessors through the random selection model. By tracking the practice of selection in city M, it is found that the random model did not achieve the “de-elitism” of the assessor’s structure as expected by the society, but instead led to the deadlock of “re-elitism”. The logic behind this is the “pressure sharing” mechanism of the local selection process, which dissolves and captures the popularization that random selection is supposed to lead to. The “pressure sharing” describes a real situation in which the local judicial administration is able to break out and release the pressure in the intertwined administrative chain under the pressure-based system, and is an important clue to understand the logic of local governance.

本文是中国博士后科学基金第70批面上资助项目（2021M701792）和中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（63222034）的阶段性成果。

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