Institutional Boundary Transition and Heterogeneity of the Earmarked Project System: A Multi-case Comparison

作为一种国家治理制度，项目制并非单向扩张，而是与相关制度之间的边界不断推移与渗透。分税制之后，“条条”得以膨胀，为强化“块块”和社会的参与激励，国家试图收缩项目制治理的边界，却导致其宏观结构和微观过程均更加复杂，异质性增强。基于地方激励性和社会嵌入性双重维度，本文对项目制的异质性展开分析，建构了压力推动—全面动员、层级分包—抓大放小、层级卸责—以点代面以及目标技术—重点铺开四种运作模式，它们是不稳定的博弈解，存在不断变迁的空间。通过四个农业农村项目的多案例比较，本文探析了四种模式更细微的展现及转化机制。

As an institution of state governance, the earmarked project system does not expand infinitely, but diffuses into other institutions. During the tax distribution reformation, “tiaotiao”expands. In order to enhance incentives for“kuaikuai” and the society, the central government attempts to reduce the influences of the earmarked project system by cutting specific fiscal transfers, pulling together disparate projects, applying formula distribution, lowering local matching funds, etc. However, this results in a more complicated system. Based on two dimensions, namely local incentive and social embeddedness, this paper constructs four ideal types of project operation, including “pressure push-overall mobilization”, “hierarchical subcontracting-large project priority”, “hierarchical responsibility release-micro engineering” and “technical governance-key breakthrough”. All types are unstable solutions, therefore constantly changing. By conducting multi-case analysis, this paper compares four rural and agricultural projects, and expounds the micro-level mechanisms.

史普原

感谢国家社会科学基金青年项目“中国科层政治与项目制的组织选择、张力及复合机制研究”（18CSH047），以及教育部青年基金项目（17YJC840031）的资助。

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