From “Oligopoly” to “Duopoly”：A Study of the Local Government’s Behavior in Land Development

在城市化背景下，学界关注市/县政府如何垄断土地开发收益，并发展出了“一元垄断”理论。在实践中，基层政府以违规开发突破了上级政府的垄断，使上级治理失效，从而形塑了“二元垄断”的格局。本文通过案例分析发现，“二元垄断”具有稳定的制度逻辑：土地管理体制与地方发展环境不兼容，以及由此诱发的上级政府对土地开发权的控制，是基层政府实施违规开发的原因。上级政府受到的合法性约束和风险约束、上级对下级的关系依赖则软化了上级的治理行动。由此，基层政府成为除上级政府之外的垄断者。“二元垄断”不仅更为深入地揭示了土地开发中的经验黑箱，还说明不同层级地方政府在复杂环境下的行为多向性，突破了地方政府单一追求收益最大化的理论预设。

In the context of Chinese urbanization, the academia focuses on the way how the municipal government monopolizes benefits from land development and develops the “oligopoly” theory. However, the grassroot government often develops land without permission from the higher-level government, causing governance failure. This results in a “duopoly” situation, which contains a stable institutional logic. The grassroot government’s violation of administrative rule is caused by the incompatibility between the land management system and the local development environment, as well as the attempt by the higher-level government to control land development as a result of the incompatibility. The higher-level government is constrained by issues of legitimacy and risk management. It therefore has to face governance failure and the grassroot government becomes another monopoly. The “duopoly” theory not only opens up the black box of land development by the local government, but also shows how governments at different levels have multiple goals in a complicated environment. It challenges the “oligopoly” theory which assumes the local government is in pursuit of the maximum benefit.

陈颀

本文为中国博士后科学基金第11批特别资助（2018T110749）、第60批面上资助（2016M600585）的成果。

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