Transcending the Fiscal Problem: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in China from the Perspective of State Governance

本文从国家治理角度整体性地探讨中国财政体制垂直不平衡存在的内在逻辑，发现中国财政体制具有很强的纵向激励功能，契合于政治组织的纵向分工架构，因应国家治理需求。中央政府依赖自上而下的纵向激励统筹地区发展和解决地方政府约束机制不完善等问题，具体包括政治激励与财政激励两种机制。政治激励在改善国家治理绩效中的不足导致财政激励的扩张，因而呈现财政体制垂直不平衡。纵向激励具有一定合理性，但也潜藏着隐患。在政策层面，本文启示财税体制改革应超越单纯的财税问题，站在国家治理的高度来系统性地进行设计。

From the perspective of state governance, we analyze the mechanisms of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) in China. We find that the VFI is endogenously determined by the central-local political arrangements as a vertical control mechanism to manage the local governments and coordinate regional development. The central government seeks for better governance by adjusting the vertical political control and vertical fiscal control. The flexible fiscal control complements the more stable political control in improving the state governance. However, there are also some latent problems that need to be considered with regard to the fiscal control mechanisms. Policymakers should take serious considerations of the relationship between the fiscal institutions and political institutions when reforming the fiscal systems and modernizing the governance system in China.

鲁建坤、李永友

本文为国家社科基金重大项目“财政体制垂直失衡的形成机制、激励结构与平衡策略研究”（批准号：15ZDA016）的阶段性成果。感谢浙江财经大学钟晓敏、童光辉等的支持。

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