How Does the Local Government Avoid Risks? —— An Analysis of the Reform of Community Property Management in City A

在社会治理过程中，各级政府部门都面临潜在风险，倾向于采用风险规避的策略。本文以A市住房与城乡建设管理委员会所主导的社区物业管理新政改革为案例，探讨地方政府部门如何通过一系列制度安排和组织设计来尽可能地化解本部门所面临的潜在风险，并由此构建了一个考察地方政府部门风险规避行为的分析框架。研究发现，政府部门采用“利益捆绑”的市场化机制、“有限自治”和“扶持社会组织”的社会化机制以及“强化基层主导地位”的科层化机制来分散风险。这三种机制在应对的风险来源、实施原则、合法性基础、协同程度、实施效果等各方面都有所不同。政府风险规避的行动逻辑可能导致“有组织的不负责任”现象的出现，产生社会矛盾加剧的治理悖论。

Government departments at different levels face various potential risks that need to be avoided in the process of social governance. This paper conducts case study of the community property management reform initiated by the Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development in City A, and illustrates how this local government department avoids potential risks through a series of institutional arrangements and organizational designs. I construct a framework to explore the actions of local government department. The local government department takes advantage of the market mechanism of “binding interests”, the social mechanism of “restricted selfgovernance” and “supporting social organization”, as well as the bureaucratic mechanism of “strengthening the dominant position of grassroots government agencies” to deal with risks. The origins of risks, the principles of implementation, the legitimate foundations, the degrees of collaboration and the effects of implementation are varied. The local government’s logic of risk avoidance may lead to the phenomenon of “organized irresponsibility”, which may exacerbate social contradictions in the future.

盛智明

本文是国家社科基金青年项目“城市治理模式对社区纠纷和业主行动的影响研究”（14CSH065）和上海高校青年教师培养资助计划（ZZSD15061）的阶段性成果。

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