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英文标题: | Active Inertia: A Study on the Mechanism of the Restructuring of the Agricultural Industries by the Local Government |
摘要: | 为什么一些地区的农业结构调整陷入了新产业-低效运作-新产业的重复低效的怪圈之中?本文将这种重复低效现象称为“积极的惰性”。本研究以南方A县的农业结构调整历程为例,发现对于经济条件较差地区的基层政府而言,频繁更换产业是在强激励与弱惩罚的激励结构下的理性行为。内容竞争、时间压力等强激励驱动基层政府上马新产业,并“大干”、“快干”;而归因困难、非正式关系介入等弱惩罚则让基层政府面临软风险约束,从而降低了更换成本。 |
英文摘要: | Why has the restructuring of agriculture been high on government agenda for decades but yielded little results during the cycles of “new projects - inefficient projects - new projects”? Based on fieldwork for one year in a county in southern China and interviews with over 100 people, we find that the frequent restructuring of agribusiness is an adaptive action to strong incentives and weak punishment mechanisms. Competition for performance and time pressure propel local cadres to chase new projects. Weak punishment reduces the cost of project failure because of the difficulty in assigning responsibility, intervention through informal ties and the multitask balance. This study investigates the institutional origins of active inertia in government, casts doubt on the government capacity in building local agribusiness and hence improves our understanding of government’s limitation in economic development. |
作者: | 刘军强、鲁宇、李振 |
作者单位: | 中山大学中国公共管理研究中心、政治与公共事务管理学院(刘军强);中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院(鲁宇);山东大学政治学与公共管理学院(李振) |
期刊: | 社会学研究 |
年.期:页码 | 2017.5:140-165 |
中图分类号: | |
文章编号: | |
关键词: | 农业结构调整;基层政府行为;归因困难;软风险约束 |
英文关键词: | |
项目基金: | 本研究为2016年度教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“社会政策创新与共享发展”(16JJD630011)的研究成果。 |
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