The Level of Decentralization and Property Rights Protection: Evidence from the industry of coal mining in China

关于地方分权与产权保护之间的关系，经济学家已经揭示了地区竞争机制的作用，却难以回答一个重要问题：在中国，地方分权从省级层面延伸到市（县）层面，能否提高对私营企业的产权保护程度？“产权的社会视角”有助于回答这个问题。我们发现，在地方分权的治理结构中，投资者除了利用地区竞争机制之外，还可以利用纵向制约的机制来保护其产权；但是，纵向制约的机制能否有效地发挥作用，依赖于投资者的维权成本之高低。相对于省级层面的地方分权，市（县）级层面的地方分权能够降低投资者的维权成本，从而更有利于纵向制约的机制发挥作用，因此提高了对私营企业的产权保护程度。

To tackle the relationship between decentralization and protection for property rights, the economists propose the theory of regional competition and try to explain its underpinning mechanism. The theory of regional competition, however, fails to account for a critical question: whether the extension of decentralization from the provincial level to prefectural(or county) level will promote the protection for private enterprises. This paper argues that the social perspective on property rights can contribute to the enquiry of this issue. We find that other than inter-jurisdiction competition, the investors can take advantage of the vertical constraints to protect their property rights under the decentralization system of China. Specifically, the effectiveness of vertical constraints depends on the resistance cost of the discontent investors. Compared with decentralization at the provincial level, decentralizing to the prefectural(or county) level significantly decreases the resistance cost of investors, which strengthens the vertical constraints and benefits the investors.

曹正汉、冯国强

本研究受浙江大学民营经济研究中心（Center for Research of Private Economy， Zhejiang University ［CRPE］）资助。

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