Allocation Mechanism of Authority and Accountability between Chinese Government Hierarchies: On the “earmarked system” 

立足于基础组织理论，结合我国政府组织间关系的现实，本文建构了政府间权责关系配置的基本框架。政府组织与企业不同，具有自身的权责类型，权威体现为汲取与产出两个维度，责任则通过监督与问责的方式和来源得以呈现。作为单一权威制国家，我国既不同于联邦制，更不同于极权机制，地方或下级政府具有有限自主性，政府组织间权责配置具有不清晰、连带，以及向上负责和责任易转嫁等特征。在此基础上，本文统合了“中国式联邦制”、“锦标赛”等假说，厘定其解释边界，以提出既契合我国特殊性，又对一般理论有挑战和贡献的假说。为了解释自上世纪90年代中期以来的政府组织间关系变迁，“项目制”研究勃兴，但尚未从组织角度展开深入思考。本文阐明“项目制”的权责配置类型，以及其变迁背后的制度背景。它让我们将视野投向讨论很少的“条条”间关系，主要体现为不同于M型和U型的“条条”竞争和纵向互倚。

Based on basic organizational theories, this paper revisits studies about the intergovernmental relationships in China, and proposes a systematic explanation framework for the allocation mechanism of authority and accountability. The institutional feature of government organization can be unfolded on two dimensions, namely authority and accountability. In China, authority and accountability of different hierarchies are not clearly defined, albeit strongly related. We need to consider the tradeoff between control and incentive, specification and coordination, to put forward better analyses. As the main accountability practicing mechanism, cadre management from above greatly affects allocation mechanism between different hierarchies of governments. However, the tournament theory on promotion lacks vision, empirical basis or explanation power. Lastly, this paper studies the “earmarked system” from the organizational perspective, and indicates that the subcontracting form is different from regional decentralization, which accentuates interdepartmental competition and expansion.

史普原

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