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英文标题: | The Information-pooling Mechanism of ROSCAs: Preliminary evidences from Wenzhou and Taizhou |
摘要: | 为什么有人通过合会向多人借钱而不是一对一地分别向他们借这笔钱?这是本文提出的问题。作者把合会中的资金借出者根据其对资金借入者相关信息的了解程度分为“信息丰富者”和“信息匮乏者”,后者可以从前者的借贷行为中获得相关信息,此外聚会还加强了成员间的信息交流和相互监督。合会的这一信息汇聚机制能降低交易费用,帮助资金需求者从信息匮乏者处借到资金。作者采用在温州和台州等地区的调查数据和案例初步验证了这一机制的部分推论。 |
英文摘要: | Why does someone borrow money from ROSCAs but not from every lender in the ROSCAs one by one ? The author divides the lenders in the ROSCAs into two types according to their information about the borrower:the more informed and the less informed.The less informed get information about the borrower from the behavior of the more informed.And the meeting also facilitates information communication and the supervision among the members in the ROSCAs.The information-pooling mechanism in ROSCAs can lower the transaction cost and help the capital demander borrow money from the less informed.Using data and cases from Wenzhou and Taizhou , the author supports some deductions of the Information_pooling mechanism. |
作者: | 张翔; |
作者单位: | 北京大学社会学系 上海高校社会学E-研究院; |
期刊: | 社会学研究 |
年.期:页码 | 2006.4:59-85 |
中图分类号: | |
文章编号: | |
关键词: | 合会; 交易费用; 信息汇聚机制; 信息丰富者; 信息匮乏者; |
英文关键词: | |
项目基金: | 上海高校社会学E—研究院(上海大学)的项目资助 |
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