The Role of Government and Farmers in Land Development and Transfer

本文主要通过分析土地征用和开发中的政府收入、政府行为,来试图理解转型期地方政府行为的一些特点和模式。在土地征用和开发过程中,地方政府主要通过财政和金融手段积聚资金,“圈地”只是“圈钱”的手段而已。这种行为一方面积累了大量的金融风险,另一方面又因为对农民土地的低价补偿造成了潜在的社会风险。究其原因,这与中央政府的集权化改革存在密切的关系。在这里我们看到一个悖论,即中央政府力图控制、改变地方政府行为的努力不但没有预期的效果,反而驱使地方政府更加强有力地谋取各种体制外资源。从这个意义上讲,1994年以前的财政分权体制与1994年以后的财政集权体制对地方政府行为的影响实质上是相同的。通过本文的分析,作者指出真正影响转型期地方政府行为的因素是软预算约束与政府获取体制外资源的能力。只要这两个因素存在并发挥作用,那么中央政府调整集权—分权框架的努力最终便会是无效的。

Based on data collected in a coastal province from 2001 to 2003, this study examines the types of government revenues from land development and transfer, and estimatesthe importance of land revenue in local governments' finance.It shows the critical importance of incomes from land for the local governments .In some cases, 60 to 80 percent of extra-budgetary government revenue as well as more than one third of budgetary revenue came from land development and transfers.One key reason for local governments' intense interests in participating in land deals is a new tax-sharing arrangement that reduces profits of local industries, and this Central government' s policy “squeezes” to motivate local governments to find alternative revenue sources.The other motivation for local governments to focus on land sales is the high profit margins created by the large gap between their monopoly over land rights and regulations and the meager compensation they pay to peasants .Based on the data collected, this study also decomposes the revenue from land deals between peasant and cadre shares.

周飞舟；

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