Exit Cost , Information and Conflict :A case study of massive failure of bidding-ROSCAs

本文试图从退出成本和信息的角度分析冲突问题。作者首先对一个"拍卖20元钱"试验的结果进行理性选择分析,指出退出成本高昂和信息不足对出现高标价起重要作用。然后作者以一起标会会案的发生和解决为例,具体说明退出成本和信息在这起标会会案的发生和解决中所起的作用。最后作者举例说明许多大冲突的发生是因为退出成本高昂和信息不足,而许多社会制度安排都具有降低退出成本、促进信息流通从而消减冲突的作用。 

This paper analyzes the conflict problem from the angle of exit cost and information.Firstly the author interprets a twenty-dollar auction with rational choice theory and finds out that high exit cost and insufficient information may be important in explaining the seemingly unreasonable high auction price.Using a case of massive failure of biddingROSCAs, the author goes on to illuminate the roles of exit cost and information played.The paper ends with several examples showing that many conflicts are due to high exit cost and insufficient information , and many institutions may have the effect of reducing exit cost and transferring information hence helping eliminating conflict .

张翔

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