Why the Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning over Litigation

近些年,中国民众在解决行政纠纷时往往会选择信访,而不进行诉讼。对此现象,学术界主要有两种解释:一种认为"信访现象"根本就是民众理性选择的结果,行政诉讼问题过多,效果不如信访。另一种则认为清代的法律文化与1978年以前的新中国历史使当代中国人具有"厌讼"或"信人治不信法治"的历史传统,或叫"路径依赖"。本文认为这两种解释都与现存的证据存在很大出入:首先,信访的效果比诉讼差得多,很少会解决信访者的问题。其次,传统中国社会——尤其在清代和民国——并不很厌讼。在此基础上,本文提出一种新的解释可能:中国民众不选择行政诉讼是因为对这种诉讼的程序感到陌生和排斥。不论古今,中国民众都似乎偏向冲突性较低、法官主导功能较强的诉讼程序和审理方式,而现代的行政诉讼制度因为不允许调解,也许显得过于生硬、冲突性过强,因而使访民产生排斥心理。 

In recent years , the Chinese public , when facing disputes with government officials, have preferred a non-legal means of resolution , the Xinfang system, over litigation.Some scholars explain this by claiming that administrative litigation is less effective than Xinfang petitioning , while others argue that the Chinese have historically eschewed litigation and continue to do so habitually .A closer examination of contemporary and historical data indicates that both explanations are questionable :Xinfang petitioning is , in fact, much less effective than litigation , and very rarely solves the petitioner' s problem.Moreover , traditional Chinese societies , particularly those in the Qing and Republican eras, did not display significant anti-litigation tendencies.This paper proposes a new explanation:Chinese have traditionally litigated administrative disputes , but only when legal procedure is not too adversarial and formally allows for the possibility of reconciliation through court-directed settlement .Since this formal possibility does not exist in modern Chinese administrative litigation , people feel uncomfortable with it . 

张泰苏

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