The Interactive Relationship between Farmers , Local Governments and the 244 State during the Course of Land Acquisition

过去20多年地方政府在以工业化为导向的经济发展目标的诱导下,不断通过土地征用获取租金最大化,其后果不仅引起农民的强烈不满和大量抗争活动,而且还威胁到中央政府的粮食安全目标以及社会的公正和稳定性。为此,中央政府在过去10多年以来做出积极的回应,一直试图重新界定中央与地方以及农民在土地征用过程中的权力关系。在中央政府一系列政策的调整之下,地方政府对土地征用的范围、规模以及审批权限乃至土地出让收入的支配权益等都被中央政府明显地削弱了。中央政府强化农民对土地的权利在很大程度上是工具性的,对农民土地的赋权本身不是中央政府追求的直接价值目标。关于土地征用制度改革的方向,在这种互动关系中我们还可以清楚地发现:土地私有化的逻辑是存在缺陷的。 

In the past 20 years, under the inducement of industrialization-guided targets of economy development , the local government tried to maximize rentals through continuous land acquisition, which brought about farmers' strong dissatisfaction and resisting activities, and threatened central government' s grain security goals as well as social justice and stability .For this reason , the central government has made active responses during the past over 10 years, trying to redefine the power relationship between the central government , local government and farmers during the course of land acquisition.With regard to the direction of land acquisition system revolution , we can find it clearly in such interactive relationship that land privatization logic does have defects.

 赵德余

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