The Effects of Tie-Strengths on Coalition Formation: An experimental investigation based on network exchange theory

网络交换论认为,“排他式”结构会产生强权,弱权者会通过联盟来对抗强权,实现权力的逆转。但现有的研究没有考虑到“关系”因素。本文检验排他武结构中关系强度对弱权者联盟的影响。实验结果证明,不考虑关系时,弱权者可以通过联盟来对抗强权,实现权力的逆转。考虑关系时,强权者坚持利益均沾原则,给每一位弱权者至少一次交易机会;强权者也坚持逆差序格局的行为逻辑,即更愿意和弱关系者、特别是无关系者交换；如果弱权者联盟后给强权者的报价低于其底线公平值(即资源均分值),强权者会拒绝交易；在弱权者联盟中出现更多的背叛,使得通过联盟逆转的权力关系再次逆转,即强权者再获强权。背叛者通常是与强权者有过合作基础的弱关系或无关系者。考虑到网络结构和关系强度后,表明关系有权宜性。

As a powerful theory explaining resource allocation in network structure, network exchange theory (NET hereafter) argues that power emerges from exclusive structure. Some scholars further propose that weak power actors would form coalitions to countervail power inequalities. However, these researches only focused on network structures, paying no attention to tie-strengths among players. This paper investigates whether tie-strengths (strong-tie, median-tie and weak-tie) could affect coalitions among weak power actors in exclusive structure. Experimental results show that when selecting exchange partners, the strong power actor adheres to equal-profit principle, i.e. he gives each weak power actor at least one opportunity to exchange; he prefer to trade with the weak-tie, which is called the reversed differential mode of association; the strong power actor usually refuses to exchange if too little payoffs are provided by the coalition members. When considering tie- strengths, defections are more likely to happen, and make the reversed power caused by coalition reverse again. The defectors are usually those weak-ties who have cooperation history with the strong power actor.

国家社会科学基金项目(编号:13BSH054)；哈尔滨工程大学中央高校基本科研基金项目(编号:HEUCF20121309)资助

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