Political Binding on Decentralization System in China: The evidence from the system of examination and approval on subway-building projects

为什么中国地方政府既承担了主要的行政事务和行政责任,同时又缺乏充分的地区治理权？现行观点一般归结为中央政府保留着任意干预地方政府的绝对权力,以便随时控制和纠正地方政府的偏离行为。本文指出,这一问题还与地方政府本身的行为有关,即地方政府在实际的权力运作上有意排斥权力的横向分立和制衡,追求地区权力一元化。地区权力一元化带来地方公共决策的风险控制问题,为此,需要建立纵向制约的决策机制,由此导致地方公共决策的风险控制最终依赖中央政府。这一结论的现实意义是,如果不能约束地方政府追求权力一元化的行为,那么,地方公共事务就不可能在本地区实现自治,当然,地方政府也就不可能获得充分的地区治理权。

Why do the local governments in China undertake the majority of the administrative affairs and responsibilities while lack complete autonomy in the meanwhile? The current discussions on this question focus on the central government's behavior, which is retaining the absolute power of intervention in case of deviation of the local governments. This paper points out that it is also related to the local governments' behavior itself. The local governments seek for the centralization of power and try to avoid the separation of public power in the local level, which leads to risk control problem of public decision-making. Thus a vertical restraint mechanism is necessary and the local public decision-making has to rely on the central government. This finding implies that it is impossible to realize local autonomy unless the local governments stop seeking for the centralization of local power.

曹正汉 薛斌锋 周杰浙

国家自然科学基金(项目批准号:71203195)

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